Thursday, September 9, 2010

Misperceptions Abound

     It is hard to determine whether one should be more concerned by what Secretary Clinton did or did not say during yesterday’s speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (http://www.cfr.org/publication/22896/conversation_with_us_secretary_of_state_hillary_rodham_clinton.html.) Clinton, in attempting to build upon tenets found in the administration’s National Security Strategy, displayed a disconcerting disregard for the world as we know it (vice the world as we would like it.) If the points highlighted in her speech are meant to be the foci for American foreign policy, there is little chance that we can hope for anything more than the drift we have experienced over the last two decades. And with drift, American power and influence diminish.
     Clinton’s speech revisited two important aspects of the NSS—first, that international power is dependent on U.S. national renewal; second, that international diplomacy matters, and that the way toward international diplomacy is through the reinvigoration, refurbishment, and/or development of international institutions. Few would argue with Point #1, although many might take issue with the current administration’s approach to its accomplishment. Point #2’s focus on international institutions, however, is dangerously misguided. Mrs. Clinton’s emphasis on such institutions relied overwhelmingly on the modifier “shared”—as in “shared problems”, “shared aspirations”, “shared commitments”, and “shared responsibility”. In doing so, she assumes that other countries, even U.S. allies, conceive of problems, goals, and a desired future in the same way that she does. Few things are further from the truth. In fact, while we fund a defense budget that is larger than the next 14-15 largest defense budgets combined, most NATO allies fail to allocate even their self-imposed minimums on defense spending. While we take for granted that individual liberty and democracy motivate nations and leaders (and, therefore, should undergird new and improved international institutions,) other countries hold sacrosanct the concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and varying interpretations of justice. While we assume a “new American moment” and the necessity of American leadership, other states collaborate to develop new institutions that limit American power and wholly omit an American presence. (Witness, for example, the developments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.)
     Secretary Clinton saved her most damning comments for the end of her speech. They are worth reading in the original:

       But there's a legitimate question, and some of you have raised it, I know, in print and elsewhere: How can you try to manage or at least address and even try to solve all of these problems? But our response, in this day where there is nothing that doesn't come to the forefront of public awareness: What do we give up on? What do we put on the back burner? Do we sideline development? Do we put some hot conflicts on hold? Do we quit trying to prevent other conflicts from unfreezing and heating up? Do we give up on democracy and human rights? I don't think that's what is either possible or desirable, and it is not what Americans do, but it does require a lot of strategic patience.

     This failure—one might even argue refusal—to prioritize American interests and threats is the single biggest indicator of continuing American drift in international politics. Even in the best of times, states must prioritize those efforts fundamental to their interests. In the worst of times (and, given our national economic situation and an overstretched military, we are dangerously close to such times,) prioritization is absolutely essential. As a past post attempted to highlight, what coherent appeal to U.S. national interests possibly supports the prioritization of crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo before Mexico’s instability? What reality prioritizes Albania’s national defense (given that Albania is a NATO member) before the requirement to maintain and advance U.S. freedom of action in the global commons (maritime, space, etc?) I know of none, but it seems that all possibilities, fanciful or not, are equally important to the United States Government.

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